Its seminal pronouncement on the issue came in the form of resolution , through which the Council affirmed that the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security.
More recently, the Security Council again called on Member States in resolution to strengthen their national anti-proliferation regimes in the implementation of resolution Our Programme supports their prevention, preparedness and response efforts at their request.
These partnerships focus on areas such as border and export control, strategic trade control, illicit trafficking, protection of CBRN materials and critical infrastructure, incident response and crisis management, and forensics, among others. The courses are available upon request. Because of the thousands of miles of borders and the millions of people and containers annually crossing these borders, the United States cannot rely on detection methods to stop non-state actors or even states from smuggling in nuclear weapons or the fissile material to make these weapons.
Highly radioactive commercial sources have a better chance of being detected because their radiation signature would be harder to shield. But detection alone is not an effective prevention technique.
Each layer of defense is imperfect but as more layers are added, the overall defense system becomes more effective. Complementing defense-in-depth is a risk reduction concept that emphasizes both reduction of the probability and consequences of nuclear and radiological terrorism.
Risk is a function of the probability of something happening such as a terrorist group acquiring nuclear material and the consequences if an event occurs such as a terrorist group detonating a nuclear explosive. Methods to reduce probability include securing nuclear and other highly radioactive materials, eliminating as much as possible these materials by developing and deploying alternative technologies, leveraging intelligence and law enforcement information to interdict non-state actors before they can use nuclear or radiological weapons, improving security at and around nuclear power plants and other potentially vulnerable nuclear facilities, and deploying radiation detection equipment at ports and border crossings as well as around high profile targets such as New York City.
Radiation emergencies may be intentional e. Below is more information on some examples of different types of radiation emergencies. Report a suspected Radiological Exposure Device to law enforcement officials immediately.
Stay as far away from the suspected RED as possible. If a RED is identified, and you believe you have been exposed, listen for instructions from emergency officials and contact your doctor. Nuclear power plants have safety and security procedures in place and are closely monitored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC external icon.
An accident at a nuclear power plant could release dangerous levels of radiation over an area called a plume. Workplaces like health care facilities, research institutions, and various manufacturing operations use radiation sources. Indeed, it has been noted that in the case of a potential nuclear attack, there is a sense of nihilism concerning the effectiveness of a medical response to the extent that civilian medical response planning is limited 3.
Despite perceived deficiencies in planning and preparedness for nuclear and radiological events, there is recognition that these events are increasingly likely to occur 4 — 6. Nuclear power accidents and nuclear detonations have resulted in mega mass casualty events with devastating acute and long-term injuries 7. Indeed, the Chernobyl nuclear accident produced the largest number of documented radioactively contaminated casualties, including scores of deaths 8.
However, the major concern is for future intentional releases of radiological materials, including surveys of expert panels that have identified terrorism involving radioactive materials as one of the most likely threats for the U. With increasing international tensions and the consistent proliferation of nuclear weapons in less-stable states, the potential for the devastating impact of nuclear weapons makes an understanding of the medical consequences of radiological and nuclear events even more strikingly important 5 , Surveys of medical personnel in recent years have indicated a concern for the level of preparedness for various components of weapons of mass destruction, as they are outside of normal practice experience.
Most of these studies have dealt with concerns for biological or chemical agents, with definitive deficiencies identified, particularly reluctance of medical personnel to participate in the midst of the crisis 11 — Relatively few studies have dealt with these issues with radiological agents, and those that have been conducted definitively indicate a need for further investigation due to fear and lack of knowledge 2 , Specific perceptions such as willingness to practice during a radiological crisis, decontamination needs of patients, and risks of exposure to the medical provider were also queried.
The written survey was administered in two languages, Japanese and English, and conducted in Japan and the U. The Japanese translation was provided by a Japanese medical provider who is fluent in English. Figure 1. The conferences and courses were selected with the intent to best ensure participation of those medical personnel who actually respond clinically in emergencies. Anonymous paper surveys distributed at various Japanese and U. The survey was devised in a series of meetings by the authors with subject matter expertise in emergency medicine and toxicology and field experience in environmental radiation exposure.
Confidentiality was maintained for all participants as the surveys did not have details of contact information and were gathered on mass, and none of them received payment or any other incentives to participate. This initiative is focused upon identifying and improving the concepts, principles, and methods to prepare health professionals and the public for clinical management of casualties during nuclear and radiological disasters and the resulting public health emergencies.
Of the respondents, were Japanese and a small number of them were from other Asian countries hereafter referred to as Japanese , and were from the U. There is a much greater affiliation of Japanese with these organized teams, at Figure 2. The number of formal courses concerning radiological or nuclear issues taken previously by the respondents is categorized, left to right, as 0, 1, 2—4, 5, or more courses with the majority of respondents having not taken any courses.
When the respondents were asked to rank what they thought would be the most immediate medical needs after a nuclear detonation, the highest ranking was given to thermal burns, followed by crush syndrome, radiation sickness, lacerations, and psychological trauma, in a steadily decreasing order Figure 3. The results were remarkably similar between Japanese and U. Japanese respondents were more likely to consider lacerations as a more immediate need than those from the U.
Overall, results for the dirty bomb, chemical, and nuclear power plant disaster options were all essentially equivalent in rank, although far below the nuclear bomb disaster. Interestingly, the respondents were the least likely to consider biological events as the type of event to make them unwilling to come to work. Indeed, they ranked nuclear bomb as 2. Figure 3. The respondents ranked what they thought would be the immediate medical needs after a nuclear detonation.
Based on the results of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki detonations and the propensity for glass in modern buildings, lacerations would be the most appropriate response as to immediate medical triage. Japanese responses are in blue, U. ARS: acute radiation sickness. Figure 4. Respondents ranked which disaster type would make them unwilling to come to work. Figure 5. Respondents ranked from 1 to 5 with 1 as most important and five as least important regarding willingness as what would make them more willing to go to work in the event of a nuclear detonation.
Respondents indicated that trusting the source of information was least important to them, followed closely by having an antidote on hand Figure 5. The next least effective factor was having equipment available to detect the radioactivity, with U. Of much greater importance was personal protective equipment PPE , with the perception that their families were safe. However, knowing that the family was safe was Indeed, knowing that their family was safe was the most important of the five options available to the U.
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